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Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) was the primary cash assistance pro-
gram in the United States until 1996.1 In that
program, participants could receive cash assis-
tance indefinitely. However, some policy-
makers questioned the logic of paying
able-bodied citizens indefinitely because wel-
fare might serve as an incentive to stay out of
the workforce. These concerns were heard,
and a number of randomized controlled trials
were conducted in multiple states to test the
effect of time limits for welfare benefits.2
These randomized controlled trials found
not only that time limits to cash assistance
incentivized participants to move into the
workforce, but also that they produced
increases in earnings relative to traditional
AFDC.2,3 Ultimately, these experiments con-
tributed to the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act in 1996.1This act was perhaps one
of the most sweeping US policies enacted
within the past 2 decades and one of the few
large-scale policies to be passed on the basis
of a large and convincing body of scientific
evidence.1,4
This act ended the federal guarantee of
income support to poor families, replacing
AFDC with a program called Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Under
TANF, states were given block grants along
with relative autonomy over many aspects of
welfare policy. Thus, TANF was implemented
differently in different states, with some states
offering much more generous benefits than
others.5 The time limits in TANF were
accompanied by incentives for work, such as
earnings disregards (allowing recipients to re-
main on welfare even while earning money)
and, in some instances, job training. As a result
of TANF, welfare rolls have plummeted, saving
taxpayer money and increasing family
earnings.6
However, despite these net benefits, both the
early randomized controlled trials and later
studies of the real-world impacts of TANF
showed that some participants—almost all of
whom were single women with children—were
simply unable to get jobs.2,7 Risk factors for
unemployment after the expiration of time
limits may have included large family size, the
presence of young children at home, or
mothers who have a mental or physical dis-
ability.5,8---10 Those who could not garner
employment after their time limits expired
often had to rely on friends and family for
survival.2,7,9,10
Moreover, the earlier trials that uncovered
these problems almost always coupled time
limits with extensive benefits (such as child
care) that are not provided under TANF in the
vast majority of states today. As welfare rolls
declined, states tended to spend the extra funds
left over in their federal block grants on other,
often unrelated programs.7 Therefore, one
might expect more adverse outcomes in the
real-world implementation of TANF than in
the early randomized controlled trials. Fortu-
nately, because states implemented TANF in
different ways, these impacts were possible to
study in a quasi-experimental manner. Studies
exploiting spatiotemporal variations in imple-
mentation of time limits in the real world
have shown similar benefits to the earlier
randomized controlled trials,2,6,11,12 but also
similar harms.7,10,13
Specifically, TANF enrollees with preschool-
aged children or larger families are both more
likely to be food insecure and, at least among
those required to enter the workforce quickly,
in poorer mental health.7,9,10,14 Spatiotemporal
analyses have suggested that time limits im-
posed under TANF were also associated with
an overall increase in infant mortality.13 Long-
term follow-up data from one such trial, Con-
necticut Jobs First (CJF), subsequently showed
that treatment produced a nonsignificant 13%
increase in mortality among all recipients and
a nonsignificant 54% increase in mortality
among women with more than 2 children.15 In
the Florida Transition Program (FTP), treat-
ment with time limits produced a16% increase
in mortality hazards.16 Whether this increase
was statistically significant depended on the
model specification. Taken together, these
Objectives. We evaluated the economic benefits of Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) relative to the previous program, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).
Methods. We used pooled mortality hazard ratios from 2 randomized con-
trolled trials—Connecticut Jobs First and the Florida Transition Program, which
had follow-up from the early and mid-1990s through December 2011—and
previous estimates of health and economic benefits of TANF and AFDC. We
entered them into aMarkovmodel to evaluate TANF’s economic benefits relative
to AFDC and weigh them against the potential health threats of TANF.
Results. Over the working life of the average cash assistance recipient, AFDC
would cost approximately $28 000 more than TANF from the societal perspec-
tive. However, it would also bring 0.44 additional years of life. The incremental
cost effectiveness of AFDC would be approximately $64 000 per life-year saved
relative to TANF.
Conclusions. AFDC may provide more value as a health investment than TANF.
Additional attention given to the neediest US families denied cash assistance
could improve the value of TANF. (Am J Public Health. 2015;105:324–328. doi:10.
2105/AJPH.2014.302235)
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data suggest that women with smaller families
and who are able bodied are better off under
TANF than AFDC. However, women who
cannot work because of disability or family
obligations may have been better off with
respect to health and longevity under AFDC
than TANF. This hypothesis is supported
by evidence that many women shifted from
TANF to Supplemental Security Income, the
program responsible for providing disability
payments.17
Despite its overall benefits, TANF is a pro-
gram for which the nonpartisan US Govern-
ment Accountability Office has pointed out that
reform is needed, particularly with respect to
provisions for those who are unable to work
(e.g., because of caregiving responsibilities or
poor mental or physical health).7 Although
many experts have felt that TANF has been
a success when evaluated on the basis of mean
monetary and social impacts, we asked
whether TANF retains its value when adverse
health impacts are assessed.
METHODS
We built a simple Markov model that was
designed to evaluate the economic benefits of
TANF relative to AFDC and to then weigh
these benefits against its potential health
threats. We assumed that the societal benefits
of TANF included (1) reduced taxation (and
thus reduced deadweight loss, or inefficiencies
that arise when money is transferred from
taxpayers to the government) attributable to
reduced numbers of cash assistance recipients
and (2) increased average family earnings.
AFDC’s benefits include increased longevity for
mothers and their children. The major assump-
tions associated with this approach are pre-
sented in the box on the next page. We tested
these assumptions in a series of sensitivity
analyses. The analytic horizon is the 46 years of
follow-up between ages 18 and 65 years, the
age at which participants become eligible for
Social Security and Medicare. We adopted the
societal perspective and adjusted all costs to
constant 2013 dollars using the nonmedical
portion of the Consumer Price Index.
Data
Health and mortality. We used a mortality
hazard ratio estimated from 2 randomized
controlled trials—CJF and FTP—of a welfare
reform program, which had follow-up from the
early to mid-1990s through December 2011.
Although our research team was involved in
the mortality analyses of CJF and FTP, the
identifiers from the data for both of these
studies are closely protected by state agencies.
As a result, we were unable to obtain appro-
vals to combine the datasets on a single
server and then analyze them as one. We
therefore combined mortality hazard ratios
using a DerSimonian-Laird random-effects
model.
We populated our models with age-specific
data from US life tables and estimated in-
creased mortality risk using the average hazard
ratio associated with time limits in CJF and
FTP.15,16,22We obtained the additional impacts
of infant mortality from the literature.13 We
applied this increase in infant mortality to our
hypothetical cohort of 5 million families with
projected life expectancy for each infant of
roughly 76 years.23 On the basis of an ob-
served annual birth rate of 0.15 per year for
women enrolled in TANF, we estimated the
total years of life lost to excess infant mortality
to be 0.001 year per TANF recipient per year
over her reproductive life (through age 50
years). We could not estimate depression im-
pacts, if any, of TANF, and therefore did not
include them.14
Cost. We assumed TANF produces cost
savings in 2 major ways.6 First, it decreases
caseloads, thereby reducing deadweight loss
associated with cash assistance.24 Second, it
increases recipients’ family income (the earn-
ings of everyone in the household less welfare
benefits), thereby producing net societal bene-
fits. We obtained deadweight loss estimates
from the economics literature.24
The overall costs of TANF are known (both
with respect to the amount directly spent on
cash assistance and the amount transferred to
the states via block grants). However, the
deadweight loss estimate itself is uncertain.24
In addition, although caseloads have dropped
precipitously under TANF, federal outlays for
block grants have dropped only slightly.7 The
excess funds are generally spent on other
government programs (also subject to dead-
weight loss).7,20 Our model was run under the
assumption that the alternative expenditures
under TANF block grants would have
occurred without the federal transfers. It was
then run again with reductions in block
grants alone.
With respect to gains in family income
associated with TANF, estimates of benefits
vary largely.25 Estimates of increased house-
hold earnings (both directly by participants
and by increases in marriage rates) range
from losses to 25% improvements.11,25 We
used an overall estimated improvement in
family income of $879 for a family with 2
children, a value based on a difference-in-
differences approach across states. We then
tested it over ranges described in the
literature.6,11,25
The overall cost of AFDC relative to
TANF was obtained from the US De-
partment of Health and Human Services.26
We used the cost and caseload of AFDC in
1994 as a baseline because it represented
the last year for which AFDC was fully in
effect. We used the total expenditures of
federal TANF money, the percentage spent
on cash assistance, and caseloads for
TANF in 2011, the last year for which we
had data.
Analyses
We conducted our analyses using Excel
2011 for Macintosh (Microsoft Corpora-
tion, Redmond, WA) and TreeAge 2014
(TreeAge Software, Williamstown, MA). We
modeled impacts only for eligible adult
women (not their children) who enroll in
welfare (either TANF or AFDC depending on
the model arm) at age 19. Our spreadsheet and
Markov models therefore simply compared
the net present value of societal costs and
deaths for the average 18-year-old female re-
cipient from 2011 through 2075—the point
at which the participant will have reached
retirement age.
To obtain these estimates for TANF recipi-
ents, we used mean annual changes in family
income as benefits in the numerator. We also
applied mortality hazards to age-specific mor-
tality rates and tally discounted infant mor-
tality impacts to the denominator. To the
AFDC cohort, we added annual deadweight
losses. Model inputs and ranges are presented
in Table 1.6,11,15,16,25 We did not use entry
or exit dynamics in the model because these
are averaged out in the cost and caseload
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values. Because we evaluated a single cohort
of women, we estimated excess life-years lost
to infant mortality using the product of
a single year of infant mortality and the average
number of children born to recipients under
TANF.
RESULTS
The box on this page lists the major as-
sumptions of the models, and Table 1 lists the
model inputs. From the societal perspective,
our concern is with the cost of a program,
regardless of who pays. Over the working life of
the average cash assistance recipient, AFDC
would cost approximately $28 000 more than
TANF from the societal perspective. However,
it would also bring 0.44 additional years of life.
The resulting incremental cost effectiveness
of AFDC relative to TANF is therefore ap-
proximately $64 000 per life-year saved
(Table 2).
These figures were sensitive to some model
assumptions, however (Table 3). In one-way
sensitivity analyses, deadweight loss estimates
did not produce much variance in the incre-
mental cost-effectiveness ratios. However, if
the marginal family income gains were equal to
the highest estimate in the literature, the in-
cremental cost effectiveness of AFDC would
drop to $262 000 per life-year saved. Infant
mortality impacts produced very little in-
fluence on the model. However, if mortality
impacts on mothers are nil, then the cost of
AFDC soars to $1.1 million per life-year
saved (based on infant mortality impacts alone).
In 2-way sensitivity analyses comparing the
hazard ratio with infant mortality, infant
mortality exerted only 0.3 percentage points
of influence on the model’s incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio (data not shown).
Major Assumptions Associated With the Markov Decision Analysis Model Comparing Cash Assistance Provisions Under
TANF With Provisions Under AFDC
1. Cash assistance has been linked to reduced marriage rates.2,18 We assumed that the harms or benefits associated with increases in marriage rates under TANF were captured by
measured changes in household income under TANF relative to AFDC.
2. We assumed that the increases in mortality seen across all experimental sites in Connecticut and Florida were generalizable to current-day recipients of TANF-funded assistance. This
assumption may have underestimated real-world mortality impacts because both experiments provided more benefits than TANF,2 the analyses used an intent-to-treat approach, and both
the treatment and control groups received the presumably harmful treatment after 2000.15,16
3. For the sake of comparison, we assumed that if TANF had not been enacted, caseloads today would be similar to what they were in 1993–1995. Caseloads steadily increased through
1994 and then showed a slight decline in 1995 and 1996.19 This assumption implies that the cyclic economic effects on caseloads—including the technology boom of the 1990s and the
Great Recession—would be averaged out.
4. Under TANF, states were given block grants. As caseloads dropped, the block grants were spent on a wide array of other programs. We assumed that savings associated with reduced
caseloads displaced other state obligations and therefore reduced deadweight loss associated with taxation.20
5. Time limits to welfare did not impact family size.21
Note. ADFC = Aid to Families With Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.
TABLE 1—Model Inputs Used in the Analysis Comparing AFDC and TANF: Connecticut Jobs
First, Connecticut, 1996–2011, and Florida Transition Program, Florida, 1994–2011
Variable Baseline High Low
Cost of AFDC (1994, in 2013 dollars)a 17 874 000 000 . . . . . .
Deadweight loss estimator,b % 32 52 16
Caseload
1994 (AFDC baseline)a 5 046 326 . . . . . .
2011 (TANF baseline)a 1 864 187 . . . . . .
TANF impacts
Marginal earnings,c % 5 25 0
Family income, 2013,a,d $ 19 530 . . . . . .
Marginal family income,e $ 878.85 4 883 0
Marginal annual savings/recipient,f $ 1 298 5 301 419
Hazard ratiog 1.16 1.32 1.00
Excess infant deaths/birthh 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004
Births/enrolled woman/year (aged 15–50 y)a 0.1550 . . . . . .
Years of infant life lost/woman/year 0.0012 0.0016 0.0009
Note. ADFC = Aid to Families With Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.
aBased on actual numbers, so no high or low value was used.
bBoth the baseline and sensitivity estimates are based on a seminal economics paper.24
cBaseline and high and low extremes were obtained from a review of the literature.2,7,9–11,20,25
dCalculated as the product of the marginal family income for a family of 3 and the percentage increase in marginal earnings
under TANF.
eThe product of the marginal increase in earnings and the total family income for 1 year.
fBased on increased earnings and reduced deadweight loss.
gBased on a meta-analysis of the Connecticut Jobs First program and Florida Transition Program. The high value represents
a plausible upper bound of 2-fold impacts considering that treatment stopped in 2000, but participants were followed
through 2011 and that the results are based on an intent-to-treat analysis. The low value assumes that there was no impact,
which is plausible given that the meta-analysis is nonsignificant if less rigorous sites are excluded and clustering is removed
from the models.
hBased on a spatiotemporal study of infant deaths.13
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DISCUSSION
Welfare reform may have produced very
large direct monetary savings, including
returns for both individuals and for the US
government.6,11,25 However, TANF may also
harm women who could not subsequently
work (whether as a result of young children at
home, large family size, or mental or physical
illness). Some may have ended up relying on
weak financial networks or become home-
less.2,7,9,10 Given that higher earnings and
employment are thought to be beneficial for
health, the observed adverse impacts on the
mothers and their children likely occurred
solely among these women who could not
work and therefore lost their welfare
benefits.13---16,27,28 In this article, we asked
whether, based on the mean cost and caseload
data of AFDC in 1994, it would still have
been more cost effective to instead subject
those AFDC families to TANF today.
We found that AFDC would cost roughly
$64 000 per life-year gained.29 In terms of life-
years saved, this is roughly in line with many
social interventions in which the government
chooses to invest.30 Examples include emergency
floor lighting in airplanes, collapsible steering
columns in cars, and airbags in cars. Smoke
detectors in homes (at $210 000/life-year saved)
roughly correlate with our high estimate of
returns on marginal family incomes associated
with TANF.30 However, few health programs
reserve standards as low as $1.1 million per
life-year saved (our estimated incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio when only infant mortality is
included), with such expensive measures gener-
ally reserved for aviation and nuclear safety.30
Thus, if the estimates of mortality hazards among
mothers are nil, then TANF is likely more cost
beneficial on the whole than AFDC.
Despite its benefits, TANF is a program for
which the US Government Accountability
Office has pointed out that reform is needed.7
For example, the program is not responsive to
economic downturns, some states are increas-
ingly reducing cash assistance rolls to meet
other budget priorities, and overall block grants
are falling over time. Finally,7,25 although
some families benefit, those who cannot work
because of mental or physical limitations
may increasingly be excluded from the pro-
gram because they, like able participants, face
time limits. Unfortunately, the main disability
program, Supplemental Security Income, is also
in need of reform and is struggling under
higher caseloads even as TANF caseloads
decline.17 Private disability insurance is highly
variable and is ironically more prevalent and
of a higher quality among higher income
workers than among lower wage earners.
As with any social policy, changes to
TANF would likely have unforeseen macroeco-
nomic consequences.31 For one, it may produce
budget deficit impacts that influence interest
rates, economic ratings, and investor percep-
tions of the US economy. Second, the other
national and local safety net programs that
have been partially accommodating unem-
ployed former TANF recipients are in an un-
precedented state of flux and transition.32
Families enrolled in TANF often receive
Medicaid and Supplemental Nutritional Assis-
tance Program benefits. Some states have
resisted increasing Medicaid enrollment under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, and the future of Supplemental Nu-
tritional Assistance Program was unclear at
the time this article was written. The extent to
which TANF modifications would impact
these dynamics within the US political econ-
omy is unknown and well beyond the scope
of this article. Future work could include
systems dynamics models, which allow for the
broader impacts of a given social policy on
health and economic well-being to be modeled
over time. Third, to the extent that such
modifications would reduce mortality, they
may also have an impact on morbidity and
therefore produce intangible benefits (e.g., on
the well-being of mothers and their children)
and costs (e.g., Medicaid enrollments and Social
Security payments).23,33 In sum, government
regulatory programs are extensive and
expensive and can sometimes be contradictory,
so simple comparisons based on incremental
cost-effectiveness ratios should be viewed in
the larger context of regulatory practices.34
Our study had several strengths. Foremost,
we used real-world cost data and derived
mortality data from a meta-analysis of 2 mul-
ticenter randomized controlled trials with
mortality follow-up over nearly 2 decades.
Despite these strengths, the study had
a number of important limitations. For one,
none of the randomized controlled trials of
welfare reform that we examined included
a measure of quality-adjusted life-years. Thus,
we could not incorporate morbidity impacts in
our study. Second, we based our mortality
estimates on randomized controlled trials in
various locations in 2 states, Connecticut and
Florida. Although these states fall roughly in
the middle range of benefits offered by states
TABLE 2—Cost, Effectiveness, and Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) of TANF









TANF 0 0 22.00 0.00 0
AFDC 28 161 28 161 22.44 0.44 64 094
Note. ADFC = Aid to Families With Dependent Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.
TABLE 3—Sensitivity Analyses
Comparing AFDC and TANF:
Connecticut Jobs First, Connecticut,
1996–2011, and Florida Transition
Program, Florida, 1994–2011
Baseline High Low
Deadweight loss estimator 77 000 54 000
Marginal family income 262 000 21 000
Hazard ratio 34 000 1 100 000
Years of infant life
lost/woman/year
63 000 68 000
Note. ADFC = Aid to Families With Dependent
Children; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families. Each value represents the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (in 2013 dollars per life-year
gained) when the high and low values from Table 1
were input into the model.
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under TANF, these results might not be gen-
eralizable to the nation as a whole. Third, the
experiments included much more generous
benefits than TANF in most states, and partic-
ipants and controls were both treated with
TANF roughly halfway through the follow-up
period. Both of these factors likely resulted in
an underestimation of mortality hazards.
It is important to note that when clustering is
removed from the FTP model, the confidence
intervals widen, and the results become only
marginally significant.35 Whether clustering
should be added to the model under these
circumstances is debatable because the num-
ber of sites in FTP was limited to 2 (or 5,
depending on the locations included). The
clustered meta-analysis is statistically signifi-
cant; however, the meta-analysis without clus-
tering of CJF and FTP is only statistically
significant when all sites are included.
If the adverse health impacts of TANF arise
because some women cannot work, reform ef-
forts should focus on this subgroup of recipients.
Reform of the disability system could include the
use of specially trained physicians for disability
assessments. Given that women with large fami-
lies appear to be disproportionately affected,9,10,15
redoubled family planning efforts and child care
investments could also help. Current efforts to
plan a universal prekindergarten program could
simultaneously provide respite for mothers and
cognitive enhancements for children.36 Such
a system could produce the win---win policy that
TANF was originally intended to be. j
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